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The FTC and Privacy and Security Duties for the Cloud

BY DANIEL J. SOLOVE

AND

WOODROW HARTZOG

hird-party data service providers, especially providers of cloud computing services, present unique
and difficult privacy and data security challenges.
While many companies that directly collect data from
consumers are bound by the promises they make to individuals in their privacy policies, cloud service providers are usually not a part of this arrangement. It is not
entirely clear what, if any, obligations cloud service providers have to protect the data of individuals with whom
they have no contractual relationship. This problem is
especially acute because many institutions sharing personal data with cloud service providers fail to include
significant privacy and security protections in the contracts that govern the exchanges. Individuals can thus
be placed at the mercy of contracts that they did not negotiate and that offer insufficient protection of their
data.
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For example, a study conducted by Fordham School
of Law’s Center on Law and Information Policy revealed that contracts between K-12 school districts and
cloud service providers lacked essential terms for the
protection of student data.1 Many of the agreements
analyzed failed to give the school districts the right to
audit and inspect the vendor’s practices with respect to
the transferred data.2 The agreements also failed to prohibit or limit redisclosure of student data or other confidential information.3 No agreement ‘‘specifically prohibited the sale and marketing of children’s information.’’4
In situations like the one above, students are caught
in the crossfire, because their interests are often ignored in these contracts unless the schools fight for
them, and it appears from the study that many schools
lack the knowledge, expertise and resources to establish the appropriate contractual arrangements. In the
context of schools, the Department of Education (DOE)
under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) has very little ability to do much about it. Unlike the Department of Health and Human Services,
which can enforce the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act directly against most entities that receive protected health information, the DOE has no direct authority under FERPA to regulate companies receiving education records.5
1
Joel Reidenberg et al., Privacy and Cloud Computing in
Public Schools, in Ctr. on Law and Info. Policy Book 2 (2013),
available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/clip/2/; see also Daniel Solove, Why Schools Are Flunking Privacy and How They
Can
Improve,
LinkedIn
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://
www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/201312170545432259773-why-schools-are-flunking-privacy-and-how-they-canimprove.
2
Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 25.
3
Id. at 28.
4
Id.
5
See Bryan Thurmond, Dismantling a Dual-Headed System of Governance: How a Regulatory Overlap Undercuts the
Security of Student Health Information in Public Schools, 64
Admin L. Rev. 701, 707 (2012) (‘‘[A]s spending legislation, [the
DOE] enforces FERPA’s provisions through the disbursement
or rescission of federal education funds.’’); Benjamin F. Sidbury, Gonzaga University v. Doe and Its Implications: No
Right to Enforce Student Privacy Rights Under FERPA, 29 J.C.
& U.L. 655, 657 (2003) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)
(‘‘[T]he language of [20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)] suggests that
FERPA does not impose a per se prohibition on the disclosure
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Situations such as the one above can also emerge
whenever any organization enlists the assistance of a
cloud service provider. Consumer data are shared with
the cloud service provider, and consumers have no direct relationship with that provider. It is up to the organization to establish the appropriate relationship with
cloud service providers. Some organizations do so quite
well, but others can fall short.
Under these circumstances, what protects individuals
whose personal data are shared by an organization with
a third party? An emerging body of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions suggests that there
can be a potentially robust set of protections—even in
contexts that have thus far fallen outside of FTC jurisdiction, such as student data maintained by schools. In
particular, we note that there are two emerging strands
of FTC jurisprudence that can address these issues. The
first pertains to data stewardship for the organizations
that share personal data with cloud service providers.
And the second pertains to third-party beneficiaries,
where the FTC has recognized that consumers need not
be a primary party to a contract in order to receive protection under the FTC Act. These two strands are essentially flip sides of the same coin. Under this approach,
data collectors must act as data stewards and protect
consumers when the organization shares information
with a cloud provider. Likewise, the cloud service provider also owes a duty to consumers, who are essentially third-party beneficiaries of the data collector’s efforts to ensure privacy and data security in their institutional bargaining.

Standards of Data Stewardship
Since the 1990s, the FTC has been regulating companies in privacy and security matters under Section 5 of
the FTC Act. This statute prohibits ‘‘unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.’’6 The FTC
has brought an extensive number of cases for problematic privacy and data security practices. We discuss in
more detail how the FTC has gone about crafting a law
of privacy from the ground up in our forthcoming article, ‘‘The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy.’’7 Privacy and data protection attorneys at the
large law firms, in-house counsel and attorneys everywhere else follow the FTC closely. They look to the FTC
for guidance about standards to follow. Thus far, the
FTC has been more of a standard codifier than a standard maker. Instead of blazing a trail by creating new
norms and standards, the FTC has waited until norms
and standards have developed and then begun enforcement.
Once the FTC has enforced based on a particular
standard, that standard achieves a new level of legitiof educational records to third parties but merely imposes a
funding precondition such that an institution will not receive
federal funding if the institution has a ‘policy or practice of
permitting the release of education records.’ An institution,
therefore, stands to lose all or a portion of its federal funding
if it has a policy or practice of disclosing its students’ educational records to unauthorized third parties.’’ (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
6
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
7
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312913.
4-7-14

macy and formality. For all intents and purposes, the
standard becomes law. Because the law of privacy and
data security is so fragmented, so magma-like in its nature, the FTC has had an unusually influential role in
shaping the law of privacy and data security by embracing certain standards and norms that have achieved a
decent level of consensus. For a long time, these standards have focused on what companies must do to protect the privacy and data security of personal data that
they maintain. This year, however, an FTC case focuses
on the standards for how a company shares personal
data with external data service providers.
The case, In re GMR Transcription Services Inc., involved the inadvertent exposure of people’s medical
data maintained by GMR, a company that provides
medical transcription services.8 The FTC concluded
that GMR’s failure to adequately choose, contract with
and oversee a data service provider constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice.9
According to the FTC complaint, GMR failed to ‘‘adequately verify that their service provider, Fedtrans,
implemented reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal information in audio and transcript files on Fedtrans’ network and computers used
by Fedtrans’ typists.’’10 Moreover, the FTC faulted GMR
for failures in contracting with its data service provider.
The FTC complaint alleged that GMR failed to:
(1) require Fedtrans by contract to adopt and implement
appropriate security measures to protect personal information in medical audio and transcript files, such as by requiring that files be securely stored and securely transmitted to
typists (e.g., through encryption) and authenticating typists
(e.g., through unique user credentials) before granting
them access to such files; and
(2) take adequate measures to monitor and assess
whether Fedtrans employed measures to appropriately protect personal information under the circumstances. . . .11

The FTC additionally found GMR to be deficient in
doing due diligence before hiring its data service provider.12 Looking broadly at the complaint, there are
three key things that the FTC is now requiring companies to do when it comes to contracting with data service providers: (1) exercise due diligence before hiring
data service providers; (2) have appropriate protections
of data in their contracts with data service providers;
and (3) take steps to verify that the data service providers are adequately protecting data.
The GMR case has a number of important implications. The GMR case indicates that organizations that
hire data service providers may be directly at fault in
many instances. The case solidifies the principle that
companies have duties of data service provider
management—in choosing, contracting with and overseeing vendors. This means that if a vendor has a problem, the organization that hired the vendor will also be
under scrutiny.
8
Complaint, In re GMR Transcription Services, Inc., File
No. 122 3095 (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/140203gmrcmpt.pdf.
9
Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re GMR Transcription Services, Inc., File No. 122 3095 (Jan. 31, 2014), available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
140203gmragree.pdf (13 PVLR 211, 2/3/14).
10
GMR Complaint, supra note 8, at 3.
11
Id. at 4.
12
Id.
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Organizations that use data service providers for data
processing might not just be victims if the data service
providers make a blunder. They might be to blame if
they did not engage in appropriate data service provider
management practices.
FTC enforcement based on inadequate data service
provider management signals that standards in this
area are starting to mature. The GMR case does not define the precise contours of what constitutes adequate
data service provider management, but the details will
be fleshed out over time. This FTC case has signaled
that more attention should be devoted to the issue, and
we can now expect more companies to take a closer
look at their own data service provider management
practices. The word is out that poor data service provider management might run afoul of the FTC Act. Even
without a data breach, poor data service provider management alone might still be a cause for FTC enforcement.
Although the FTC generally cannot enforce against
public-sector entities, the GMR case still has important
implications. The case now establishes more clearly
that there is a standard of care when it comes to contracting. The principles in this case apply to nearly all
businesses, and FTC decisions reflect the consensus
norms about privacy. If nearly all companies are legally
obligated to do what the FTC demands in this decision,
then this puts a lot more pressure on schools and other
public-sector organizations to do so.

Protections of Third-Party Beneficiaries
The FTC is also not limited in protecting consumers
only when they have a direct relationship with an entity
that maintains their personal data. In its early cases, the
FTC focused primarily on enforcing company privacy
policies. But later on, the FTC broadened its enforcement far beyond privacy policies. Deception is a broad
concept, and it is not limited to the explicit promises a
company might make. Unfairness is even broader. An
‘‘unfair’’ trade practice is one that ‘‘causes or is likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition.’’13 An exceptionally wide range of activities has been included in the FTC’s unfairness and
regulatory efforts.14 Many of the alleged unfair actions
seek to take advantage of vulnerable consumers, making exploitation the locus of many unfairness allega13

15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
See Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973) (respondent
had distributed free sample razor blades in such a way that
they could come into the hands of small children) (consent
agreement); Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1961) (seller’s servicemen dismantled home furnaces and
then refused to reassemble them until the consumers had
agreed to buy services or replacement parts); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (1988) (unilateral imposition
of fees in breach of a service contract); Press Release, FTC,
FTC Charges Fitness Quest, Inc. With Making Deceptive
Claims and Failing to Disclose a Safety Risk From Use of Its
‘‘Gut Buster’’ Exercise Device (Jan. 8, 1990), http://
www.casewatch.org/ftc/news/1990/gutbust.shtml (‘‘Breakage
has allegedly caused substantial physical injury to consumers,
and failure to disclose such a risk is alleged to be an unfair
practice.’’).
14

PRIVACY & SECURITY LAW REPORT

tions.15 Thus, the FTC has very broad and general regulatory authority by design to allow for a more nimble
and evolutionary approach to the regulation of consumer protection.
Because FTC enforcement is not tethered to any specific privacy policy and is primarily focused on protecting consumers, it becomes quite apparent that the FTC
has the authority to regulate entities maintaining personal data even if those entities do not make any promises directly to the people to whom the data pertain.
In In re Vision I Properties LLC, the FTC brought an
action against Vision I Properties, a company that provided software that created customized shopping cart
pages for other companies.16 Vision I rented people’s
personal data collected through its software to direct
marketers. This was in violation of some of the privacy
policies of the companies using Vision I’s software.
Even though Vision I was not violating its own privacy
policy, the FTC concluded that it thwarted consumer
expectations formed based upon the privacy policies of
the other companies.17
The import of this case is that the FTC did not see this
scenario as involving merely an arrangement between
Vision I and other companies. Consumers were caught
in the middle, and the FTC ensured that their interests
would not be lost in the relationship. Consumers need
not have a direct relationship to companies that cause
them harm. Combining Vision I with GMR suggests that
consumers can be harmed when the appropriate contractual protections are not included in agreements involving the sharing of personal data.
Additionally, the FTC has already developed a theory
of data security that requires companies holding personal information to ensure that third-party recipients
will safeguard any data the company shares.18 Specifi15
See, e.g., R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc v. FTC, 291 U.S. 304,
313 (1934) (finding unfairness where an action ‘‘exploit[s] consumers, children, who are unable to protect themselves’’);
Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408,
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8355
(July 2, 1964).
16
Complaint, In re Vision I Properties, LLC, File No. 042
3068, Docket No. C-4135 (Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/04/
050426comp0423068.pdf.
17
Decision and Order, In re Vision I Properties, LLC, File
No. 042 3068, Docket No. C-4135 (Apr. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/04/
050426do0423068.pdf.
18
For examples of FTC critiques of inadequate third-party
access control, see, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 12, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-PGR (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012),
available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/
Federal_Trade_Commission_v_Wyndham_Worldwide_
Corporation_et_al_Do/5 (12 PVLR 1946, 11/18/13); Complaint
for Civil Penalties, Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 7,
United States v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., No. 0:09-cv00524-PJS-JJK (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://
www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_of_
America_v_Rental_Research_Services_Inc_et_al_Doc (8 PVLR
396, 3/9/09); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief at 5, United States v. ValueClick, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-01711-MMM-RZ (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
2008), available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/
document/United_States_of_America_v_Valueclick_Inc_et_al_
Docket_No_208cv01 (7 PVLR 414, 3/24/08); Complaint at 4–5,
In re Upromise, Inc., File No. 102 3116, Docket No. C-4351

ISSN 1538-3423

Electronic
copy
availableat:at:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424998
Electronic
copy
available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424998
Electronic
copy
available
at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424998

BNA

4-7-14

4
cally, the FTC has filed complaints of unfairness against
companies it alleged failed to verify and authenticate
the identities of third-party recipients,19 failed to monitor the data recipient’s activity20 and failed to require by
contract third-party protection of information.21 The
FTC could adopt a similar approach with respect to
privacy-based requirements, such as requirements for
confidentiality and data minimization and prohibitions
on re-identification, data mining and certain kinds of
advertising and marketing to those identified.
The FTC’s power to protect third-party beneficiaries
of institutional bargaining extends to companies that
provide cloud services to public-sector entities. Although the FTC can generally only regulate commercial
entities under Section 5,22 when public-sector institutions such as schools use private-sector cloud service
providers, the FTC can regulate the cloud service provider. Although the cloud service provider might not
have a direct relationship with the individuals whose
data they maintain, these individuals are third-party
beneficiaries of the privacy promises made by those
who provide data to cloud service providers. So if a
school enters into a contract with a cloud service pro(F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2012/04/
120403upromisecmpt.pdf (11 PVLR 61, 1/9/12); Complaint at 2,
In re ACRAnet, Inc., File No. 092 3088, Docket No. C-4331
(F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110809acranetcmpt.pdf
(10 PVLR 188, 2/7/11); Complaint at 3–4, In re Premier Capital
Lending, Inc., File No. 072 3004, Docket No. C-4241 (F.T.C.
Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/cases/2008/12/081206pclcmpt.pdf (7 PVLR
1603, 11/10/08); Complaint at 2, Nations Title Agency, Inc., File
No. 052 3117, Docket No. C-4161 (F.T.C. June 19, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
2006/06/0523117nationstitle_complaint.pdf (5 PVLR 689,
5/15/06). This includes the failure to verify and authenticate the
identities of third-party recipients as well as the failure to
monitor or otherwise identify unauthorized recipient activity.
See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and
Other Equitable Relief at 4, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc.,
No. 1:06-cv-00198-GET (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_
States_of_America_v_ChoicePoint_Inc_Docket_No_
106cv00198_N (5 PVLR 110, 1/30/06) (discussing defective
verification policies). It includes general charges of failing to
protect information in the hands of third-party recipients as
well as very specific charges by the FTC such as ‘‘[f]ailing to
oversee service providers and to require them by contract to
implement safeguards to protect respondent’s customer information.’’ Nations Title Agency Complaint, supra note 18, at 4.
19
See, e.g., ChoicePoint Complaint, supra note 18, at 5 (admonishing company for accepting contradictory verification
documentation).
20
See id. at 9–10.
21
This is also a violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Safeguards Rule. See, e.g., Complaint, In re Sunbelt Lending
Servs., Inc., File No. 042 3153, Docket No. C-4129 (Jan. 7,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2005/01/050107comp0423153.pdf (analyzing
violations of Safeguards Rule) (3 PVLR 1316, 11/22/04); Nations Title Agency Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4 (same).
22
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 766–67 (1999);
Community Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir.
1969).
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vider where student data are shared with the provider,
that provider must live up to consumer expectations.
Moreover, if the provider negotiates a deficient contract
with a school, the deficiencies in this arrangement
might themselves be contrary to student expectations.
As the FTC recognized in GMR, protecting privacy involves structuring relationships with cloud providers
appropriately. There might be a reciprocal obligation
on the part of the cloud service provider to structure the
appropriate relationship with the entity supplying the
data to ensure consumers are not harmed or misled.
As of this time, the FTC has not gone quite this far,
but the foundations are present in its jurisprudence for
it to start taking these steps. It takes two to tango, and
the FTC has the principles in place to recognize this fact
and enforce GMR-like standards on both sides of contracts with cloud service providers.

Cloud Service Providers as Data Stewards
The FTC has started to embrace a larger philosophy
that third-party data service providers should act as
data stewards. In other words, companies that collect,
use and share personal data owe certain responsibilities
to the data subjects. These responsibilities could include ensuring harm from the use and distribution of
data is minimized through the use of technical safeguards, administrative procedures and contractual
terms. Data stewardship is already a concept embraced
in certain specific areas, such as health care. The FTC’s
approach draws upon the tradition of ‘‘third-party beneficiaries’’ in contract law, whereby intended thirdparty recipients of benefits of a contractual term are entitled to enforce that term even though they are not
technically a party to the agreement.23
Good stewardship even has a fiduciary-like quality
whereby relationships with stark disparities in power
are sometimes treated differently than those who negotiate at arm’s length. In this way, the FTC approach is
similar to that of courts when finding implied obligations of confidentiality.24 Consumers have very little
ability to ensure that cloud service providers protect the
personal data that were entrusted to them, which
makes these consumers vulnerable and largely unable
to reasonable avoid risk. The FTC has laid the foundations for establishing standards of data stewardship on
each side of the cloud service relationship. The next
steps have yet to be taken, but the path is there, waiting to be traversed.
23

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304 (1981); Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and
Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 Temp. L.
Rev. 891, 928 (2009).
24
Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89
Ind. L.J. 763, 777–78 (2014) (‘‘To courts, implied expectations
of confidentiality were more plausible in developed relationships, unequal bargaining power could inhibit the ability of
vulnerable parties to explicitly request confidentiality, and relationships formed in pursuit of a common goal required confidentiality to be effective. The courts’ keen attention to vulnerability has yet to be as rigorously applied in most online environments.’’)
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